Colorado’s statutory framework governing driving under the influence (DUI) is both comprehensive and nuanced and covers “vehicles” and “motor vehicles” under Title 42 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. While the state’s DUI prohibitions extend broadly to the operation of both motor vehicles and vehicles, the Express Consent Law—which governs chemical testing obligations and license revocations—applies only to the operation of motor vehicles.
This distinction creates a significant legal consequence: individuals operating bicycles or electrically assisted bicycles may be charged criminally under Colorado’s DUI or DWAI statutes, yet are not subject to the implied consent provisions that authorize mandatory chemical testing or administrative penalties for refusal.
This article examines the statutory interplay between the DUI provisions at C.R.S. § 42-4-1301 and the Express Consent Law at C.R.S. § 42-4-1301.1, analyzing their textual scope, legislative intent, and practical implications for cases involving non-motorized or partially motorized vehicles.
The Dual Structure of Colorado’s DUI Framework
Colorado’s impaired driving statutes distinguish between the substantive criminal offenses of DUI, DUI per se, and DWAI, and the procedural mechanism by which law enforcement obtains chemical evidence through the Express Consent Law.
C.R.S. § 42-4-1301 defines the offenses of driving under the influence and driving while ability impaired, applying to “a person who drives a motor vehicle or vehicle” under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination thereof. The inclusion of both “motor vehicle” and “vehicle” broadens the statute’s reach beyond traditional automobiles to encompass devices such as bicycles, scooters, mopeds, and electrically assisted bicycles, each of which is explicitly included in the statutory definition of “vehicle.”
In contrast, C.R.S. § 42-4-1301.1, Colorado’s Express Consent Law, applies exclusively to “a person who drives any motor vehicle” within the state. Under this statute, a motorist operating a “motor vehicle” is deemed to have given express consent to a chemical test of blood or breath when probable cause exists for a DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD (underage drinking and driving) investigation. The statutory choice to limit the Express Consent Law to “motor vehicles,” while maintaining the broader “motor vehicle or vehicle” terminology within the DUI statute, demonstrates a deliberate legislative differentiation in scope.
Statutory Definitions: The Vehicle–Motor Vehicle Divide
To understand the boundaries of these statutes, one must turn to the definitional provisions in C.R.S. § 42-1-102, which governs terms used throughout Title 42.
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Motor Vehicle is defined in subsection (58)(a) as a “self-propelled vehicle that is designed primarily for travel on the public highways,” expressly excluding electrically assisted bicycles and vehicles moved solely by human power. However, subsection (58)(b) expands the definition to include a low-power scooter for purposes of certain sections, including § 42-4-1301 and § 42-4-1301.1, thereby bringing mopeds and similar devices within the purview of both the DUI law and Express Consent Law.
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Vehicle, defined at subsection (112), includes “a device that is capable of moving itself, or of being moved, from place to place upon wheels,” and specifically includes “a bicycle, electrical assisted bicycle, [and] electric scooter.”
Thus, the statutory framework establishes a hierarchy: all motor vehicles are vehicles, but not all vehicles are motor vehicles. Consequently, a person operating a bicycle or electrically assisted bicycle is driving a “vehicle” under § 42-4-1301, but not a “motor vehicle” under § 42-4-1301.1.
The Criminal Liability for Bicyclists Under DUI Statutes
Colorado courts have consistently applied the DUI statute to individuals operating bicycles or other non-motorized vehicles. The controlling statutory text at C.R.S. § 42-4-1301(1)(a) criminalizes the act of driving a “motor vehicle or vehicle” while under the influence.
This means that an individual riding a bicycle or an electrically assisted bicycle can indeed be charged and convicted of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI, provided the prosecution can establish impairment or a prohibited blood-alcohol content under the standard evidentiary framework.
However, the mechanism for proving intoxication differs in practical application. Because the Express Consent Law does not apply, law enforcement officers cannot rely on the statutory presumption of consent to obtain chemical tests, nor can they impose administrative driver’s license consequences for refusal.
Instead, in bicycle-related DUI cases, the state must rely on voluntary testing, field sobriety observations, officer testimony, and other forms of circumstantial evidence to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Express Consent Law: Limited Scope and Legislative Intent
C.R.S. § 42-4-1301.1 begins unambiguously:
“Any person who drives any motor vehicle upon the streets and highways and elsewhere throughout this state shall be deemed to have expressed such person’s consent to the provisions of this section.”
The repeated reference to “motor vehicle” throughout the provision underscores that the legislature intended to limit the testing mandate and associated administrative penalties to operators of motorized conveyances.
The legislative rationale is apparent. The Express Consent framework is closely tied to driver licensing, administrative revocation, and public safety concerns arising from the operation of motorized vehicles on public highways. Extending these provisions to non-motorized vehicles would yield illogical results—bicyclists and electric-assisted cyclists are not subject to the same licensing regime, nor do they pose equivalent risks to property or public safety as automobiles or mopeds.
Accordingly, while the state may prosecute a bicyclist criminally for DUI, it lacks statutory authority to compel a chemical test under the Express Consent Law or to revoke a license administratively for test refusal in such cases.
Distinguishing Mopeds and Low-Power Scooters
A frequent point of confusion arises when distinguishing bicycles and electric-assisted bicycles from mopeds or low-power scooters.
Under C.R.S. § 42-1-102(48.5), a low-power scooter is defined as a self-propelled vehicle designed for roadway use, with limited cylinder capacity or wattage (not exceeding 50cc or 4,476 watts). Crucially, subsection (b) expressly excludes bicycles and electrically assisted bicycles from this definition.
Yet, subsection (58)(b) of the same statute clarifies that low-power scooters are included within the definition of “motor vehicle” for purposes of both § 42-4-1301 and § 42-4-1301.1. As a result, mopeds and low-power scooters fall squarely within the Express Consent regime, subjecting their operators to mandatory testing and license revocation for refusal.
This statutory treatment highlights a clear policy distinction: while bicycles and electric-assisted bicycles are governed by the DUI statute alone, mopeds and scooters are treated similarly to automobiles for both criminal and administrative purposes.
Administrative Consequences and Enforcement Challenges
The limitation of the Express Consent Law to motor vehicles presents unique enforcement challenges. For a bicyclist arrested for DUI, refusal to submit to a chemical test carries no administrative penalty—no driver’s license revocation or reinstatement condition may attach.
Nevertheless, prosecutors may still pursue the DUI charge based on officer observations, admissions, and physical evidence. In practice, law enforcement officers often forego chemical testing entirely in such scenarios, recognizing the lack of statutory compulsion and administrative remedy.
From a procedural standpoint, the absence of Express Consent applicability also means that the state cannot invoke the per se blood-alcohol presumptions established by chemical analysis in § 42-4-1301(6)(a). Thus, the evidentiary burden shifts to demonstrating impairment through behavioral and circumstantial evidence, a notably higher bar in many cases.
Policy Considerations
The divergent treatment of motorized and non-motorized vehicles reflects both public policy and statutory pragmatism. The primary purpose of Colorado’s impaired driving laws is to safeguard roadway users from the dangers of impaired operation of motor vehicles, which, due to their size, speed, and prevalence, present greater risks to life and property.
Bicyclists, though capable of endangering themselves and others, do not carry the same destructive potential. By excluding bicycles from the Express Consent framework, the legislature avoided imposing disproportionate procedural and administrative consequences on conduct less likely to yield catastrophic outcomes.
At the same time, by maintaining the broad “vehicle” language in § 42-4-1301, the legislature ensured that intoxicated cyclists remain accountable under the criminal code. This balance upholds both deterrence and proportionality within Colorado’s broader impaired-driving regime.
Conclusion
In Colorado, a person may be criminally liable for DUI or DWAI while operating a bicycle or electrically assisted bicycle, as these devices qualify as “vehicles” under C.R.S. § 42-1-102(112). However, because neither qualifies as a “motor vehicle,” the Express Consent Law at C.R.S. § 42-4-1301.1 does not apply.
The distinction is legally significant: bicyclists and electric-assisted cyclists are not deemed to have consented to chemical testing, cannot be penalized administratively for refusal, and are not subject to the driver’s license revocation provisions that accompany motor vehicle DUIs.
While the criminal liability remains intact, the procedural and evidentiary tools available to the state differ markedly. This nuanced differentiation reflects Colorado’s legislative intent to preserve roadway safety while respecting the practical realities of non-motorized vehicle operation.
Ultimately, the law achieves a balance—holding all operators accountable for impairment while reserving the most stringent procedural mechanisms for those who drive motorized vehicles upon Colorado’s public highways.